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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 920255-CA
Priority No. 2

v.
KIRK DUDLEY,
Defendant/Appellant
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SALVATORE CALCATERRA,
Defendant/Appellant.:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendants Kirk Dudley and Salvatore Calcaterra appeal their
respective convictions for attempted possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), -(2)(b)(ii) and -(7) (Supp.
1992) and possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated

§ 58-37-

8(2)(a)(i) and -(2)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1992) pursuant to a plea bargain
in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County,
Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(f) (1992).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was the trial court correct in denying defendants' motion
to suppress marijuana found in defendants' car where an officer
stopped defendants for speeding on the highway and, in the course
of issuing a traffic citation, smelled the odor of burnt marijuana
emanating from the vehicle and then searched the car, finding
marijuana in the passenger compartment?
"In absence of clear error, the trial court's findings of fact
underlying its decision to grant or deny the suppression motion
must be upheld."

State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.

1991) (citing State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah 1989)).

The

legal conclusions that the trial court draws from those findings,
however, will be reviewed under a correction of error standard.
Steward, 806 P.2d at 215 (citing State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326,
327 (Utah App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah
1991)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on appeal
is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After a hearing in which the court denied defendants' motion
to suppress, defendants entered into plea bargains pursuant to
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Salvatore Calcaterra
was thereafter convicted of possession of a controlled substance,
cocaine

(Calcaterra

R. at

80, 100-02),
2

and Kirk Dudley was

convicted of attempted possession of a controlled substance, also
cocaine (Dudley R. at 53, 71-73).

The court stayed the execution

of a prison sentence and fine and placed Calcaterra on 36 months
probation, on condition that he serve 30 days in jail and pay a
fine of $1150 (Calcaterra R. at 100-02). The court also stayed the
execution of Dudley's sentence and fine and placed him on 36 months
probation on condition that he serve 15 days in jail and pay a fine
of $775 (Dudley R. at 71-73).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The findings of the trial court arising from the suppression
hearing on April 24, 1991, are not contested and are presented
below in their entirety (R. 39-42).

Citations to the transcript

have been added.
1. That on December 9, 1990, the Defendant,
Salvatore Calcaterra was driving his vehicle,
and Defendant Kirk Dudley was a passenger,
northbound on 1-15 about five miles from the
Utah border (T. 7-8).
2. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper James Lloyd
stopped the vehicle at about mile post six,
after determining the Calcaterra vehicle was
traveling about 78 miles an hour in a zone
where that was excessive speed (T. 7).
3. That Trooper Lloyd issued a citation to
Mr. Calcaterra for the speeding violation (T.
11).
4. That during the process of the filling out
of the citation in his vehicle, Trooper Lloyd
requested information from EPIC — El Paso
Information Center — for the reason that he
had sine lied marijuana in the vehicle as he was
speaking to the driver at the side of the
vehicle prior to the issuance of the citation
(T. 47).
5.

That the officer did detect the odors of
3

marijuana (T. 9, 12-13, 31).
6.
The officer went back to the vehicle,
issued the citation to Mr. Calcaterra, handed
him the citation and his driver's license (T.
11/ 44).
7. That it was a normal traffic violation,
with the addition of an odor of marijuana.
8.
That the officer asked Mr. Calcaterra
whether or not he had drugs, weapons or
alcohol in the vehicle (T. 13, 40, 44).
9. Mr. Calcaterra replied that he did not (T.
13, 40).
10. The officer asked if he could search the
trunk of the vehicle (T. 13).
11. Mr. Calcaterra replied that he was not
carrying anything (T. 13, 49).
12.
The officer asked again if he could
search the trunk of the vehicle (T. 13).
13.
Mr. Calcaterra then alighted and went
around and opened the trunk of the vehicle and
allowed the officer to search (T. 13, 49).
14. While he was engaged in the search of the
trunk, the officer received a response from
the dispatcher in Cedar City to his inquiry of
EPIC, indicating that Mr. Calcaterra had a
previous history of involvement in drugs [sic]
offenses (T. 14, 41).
15o The officer returned to the vehicle and
continued the search of the trunk and found
nothing of note in the trunk.
16. The officer asked Mr. Calcaterra about
the information that he'd received from the
dispatcher relating to an alleged conviction
involving the transportation of drugs (T.16).
17. Mr. Calcaterra explained to the officer
as he understood it, that he had been
arrested, but the charges had been dismissed
(T. 16).
18. The officer then asked if he could search
4

the interior of the vehicle (T. 17).
19. Mr. Calcaterra indicated that he was not
carrying any of the things that the officer
was looking for (T. 17).
20. The officer then inquired a second time
whether he could search the interior of the
vehicle by saying, "May I search the interior
of the vehicle, then?" (T. 17).
21. Mr. Calcaterra shrugged his shoulders,
with a motion which the officer indicated on
the witness stand (T. 17, 42).
22. The officer took that to be consent and
proceeded to search the vehicle (T. 18).
23.
Mr. Calcaterra did not object to the
search of the vehicle at that time, nor did
the passenger of the vehicle.
24. The officer, in searching the vehicle,
determined that there was a small quantity of
marijuana and what appeared to be a marijuana
pipe hidden in a plastic receptacle on the
console portion of the vehicle (T. 21).
25. When Mr. Calcaterra determined that the
drug had been found, he approached the officer
and asked for a break (T. 24).
26.
The officer then handcuffed Mr.
Calcaterra and placed him under arrest (T.
23).
27.
Mr. Dudley was likewise arrested and
handcuffed when the second officer arrived.
28. The officers then proceeded to complete
the search of the vehicle and discovered other
items of contraband while the defendants were
standing by handcuffed and under arrest (T.
25).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After lawfully stopping a vehicle for a traffic offense, the
police officer issuing the traffic citation smelled the odor of
burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle he had stopped.

5

Under the

federal "plain smell" correlary to the warrant requirement's plain
view exception, the smell of marijuana provided the officer with
probable cause to search the vehicle.

Defendants' argument that

the detention became unlawful once the traffic citation was issued
because

the

reasonable

suspicion

necessary

to

continue

the

detention did not exist is without merit in light of the officer's
detection of the burnt marijauna odor.
Defendants' focus on whether defendant Calcaterra voluntarily
consented to the search is misplaced; consent is not a component of
the plain view (or here, the "plain smell") exception to the
warrant requirement.

The issue of consent need not be reached in

order to uphold the lawfulness of the vehicle search. The trial
court's denial of defendants' motion to supress, therefore, should
be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANTS' DETENTION FOLLOWING
THE ISSUANCE OF THE TRAFFIC CITATION WAS
LAWFUL BECAUSE THE OFFICER SMELLED MARIJUANA
IN THE VEHICLE, WHICH CONSTITUTED NOT ONLY
REASONABLE
SUSPICION
TO
FURTHER
DETAIN
DEFENDANTS, BUT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THEIR
VEHICLE AS WELL.
Defendants assert on appeal that the scope of their detention
was unlawful under both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution. However, they have failed to develop any meaningful
argument under the Utah Constitution, either at the trial court or
on appeal. Mere nominal allusion to a state constitutional claim,
unsupported by meaningful analysis, will not suffice to permit
6

appellate review.

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327-28; State v.

Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73 & n.5 (Utah App. 1990).
situation, the matter is waived.1

In such a

Analysis, therefore, must

proceed under the federal constitution.2
The

Fourth Amendment

to the United

States

Constitution

provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated . . •."
As this provision applies to encounters between police and
citizens,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

identified

three

constitutionally acceptable levels of police stops:
"(1) [AJn officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that
the person has committed or is about to commit
a crime; however, the 'detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop;' (3) an
officer may arrest a suspect if the officer
has probable cause to believe an offense had
been committed or is being committed."
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied.

1

Nor have defendants argued "plain error" or "exceptional
circumstances" that might afford them relief from the appellate
waiver normally resulting from the failure to develop the
constitutional argument below. See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d
920, 920-26 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435
(Utah App. 1990).
2

This Court has noted that the standard required by the Utah
Constitution, however, may well be different from that required by
the United States Constitution. See State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d
969, 973 n.7 (Utah App. 1992).

7

476 U.S. 1142 (1986)).

In the context of traffic stops, "when an

officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, he may briefly
detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle
registration and the driver's license." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.
2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979)). And, when an officer makes such a stop, "[t]he length and
scope of the detention must be "'strictly tied to and justified by'
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
In this case, it is undisputed that the initial traffic stop
was a valid one, falling within the second level articulated by the
Utah Supreme Court in Deitman, based on uncontroverted evidence
that defendant was travelling well in excess of the speed limit.
The officer was standing next to the driver's side window, where he
had a lawful right to be, and was obtaining the driver's license
and registration, when he smelled "an intermittent odor of what
smelled like marijuana" as well as "a strong perfume odor" (T. 9).
He returned to his police car, ran a warrants check, and returned
to defendants' car to issue the citation to the driver.

At this

point, he again smelled marijuana.
When the driver accepted the citation, the purpose of the
original detention was fulfilled,
Defendants, however, would

end

just as defendants assert.

the

analysis

at

this

point,

asserting that once the citation was issued, the detention became
unlawful.

They would ignore the court's uncontroverted factual

finding that the officer smelled burnt marijuana emanating from the
8

vehicle and would instead baldly state that, in continuing the
detention, "[t]he officer was acting on a hunch based on a profile"
(Defendant's Br, 13).

There is simply no record support for

defendants' claim.
Defendants cite a potpourri of Utah cases but fail to apply
the law of those cases to the facts of the instant case.

As but

one example, defendants discuss at length State v. Robinson, 797
P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), a case in which officers validly stopped
a vehicle on the highway for a traffic violation, ran a warrants
check that produced nothing of note, issued a citation, and then
continued to detain the vehicle without any reasonable suspicion of
criminal

activity.

Eventually,

discovered marijuana.

they

searched

the

car

and

The Court held that the circumstances

confronting the officers, including the driver's nervousness,
defendants' inability to produce a written authorization to drive
the allegedly borrowed car, an inability to contact the owner by
phone, and a lack of any visible cold weather gear in the vehicle3
were

"insufficient

to

provide

the

officers

with

reasonable

suspicion of car theft or other serious crime sufficient to justify
the roadside detention and questioning that followed."
Robinson,

797 P. 2d at 436.

Robinson, then, stands

State v.
for the

proposition that once the purposes of an initial lawful stop have
been accomplished, an officer must have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to justify a continued detention and further

3

Defendants told the police they were on a two-week trip to
the Wind Rivers to visit a friend and to fish.

9

questioning.

JxL at 437.

In this case, the distinctive odor of burnt marijuana provided
the officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity/

The

Robinson test is not only met, however; it is exceeded.

The

uncontroverted evidence of the marijuana odor emanating from the
vehicle elevated the stop to a level three detention and provided
the officer with probable cause to search the vehicle.

See State

v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Bartlev, 784 P.2d 1231# 1236 (Utah App. 1989).
POINT II
THE OFFICERS' SEARCH OF DEFENDANTS' VEHICLE
WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA
EMANATING FROM THE VEHICLE; UNDER FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CONSENT IS NOT A REQUIRED
COMPONENT OF THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
Defendants frame their argument on appeal in terms of consent,
asserting either that defendant Calcaterra's shrug of his shoulders
did not constitute unequivocal consent or that, if he did consent,
he did not do so voluntarily because he was not free to leave. The
trial court ruled on the issue, concluding that defendant consented

* "Whether the requisite reasonable suspicion was present to
support an investigatory detention by a police officer presents a
question of fact." State v. Robinson', 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App.
1990) (citing State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987)). A
trial court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless "clearly
erroneous."
Id. (citations omitted).
A finding is clearly
erroneous if "it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah
1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
But see State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 14-15 (Utah App. 1991), cert,
denied, (Utah June 19, 1992) (reasonable suspicion treated as a
conclusion of law).
10

to the search of the vehicle by shrugging his shoulders and not
objecting to the search and that the consent was voluntary (See
Addendum at 42-43).
of consent.

This Court, however, need not reach the issue

It may affirm on any other proper alternative ground,

even if that ground was not assigned by the trial court as the
reason for its denial of defendant's motion to suppress. State v.
Gallecros, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985);

State v. Droneburq, 781

P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 1989).
Plainly, a warrantless vehicle search will be unreasonable per
se unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d
664, 671-72 (Utah App. 1991). The United States Supreme Court long
ago established that a warrantless car search is permissible,
however, if a police officer has probable cause to believe that the
car contains contraband or criminal evidence that may be lost if
not seized immediately.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,

151-52 (1925); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07
(1982); State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Utah 1986); State
v. Leonard,

825 P.2d

requirement,

based

on

at 672.
the

One exception to the warrant

rationale

includes objects within plain view.

articulated

in Carroll,

The requirements for this

exception are that: 1) the officer is lawfully present at the
location; 2) the evidence is in plain view; and 3) the evidence is
clearly incriminating.

State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah

App. 1989).
Within the plain view exception, courts have developed a
11

"plain smell" rule. The constitutional rationale for this rule is
that the distinctive odor of marijuana constitutes a "plain smell"
and, therefore, falls within the plain view exception described
above.

State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d at 972.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
stated:

"This court has long recognized that marijuana has a

distinct smell and that the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the
probable cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage." United
States v, Morin, 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing United
States v, Merrvman, 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1980)).

The

United States Supreme Court has also upheld the warrantless search
of a vehicle's passenger compartment, when that search was based
only on the odor of marijuana emanating from the car.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981).

Robbins v.

This Court, applying the

plain view test to plain smell, has stated that "objects in 'plain
view'... may be seized without a warrant if the police officer is
lawfully present and the evidence is clearly incriminating.
exception encompasses

items within

'plain smell'."

This

State v.

Bartlev, 784 P.2d at 1235 (citations omitted); see also State v.
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d at 972 (and cases cited therein).
The facts of this case fall squarely within the purview of the
plain smell rule. First, the legality of the initial traffic stop
is undisputed.

The officer was lawfully present by the driver's

side of the vehicle, issuing a traffic citation for a speeding
violation. Second, the trial court made a finding of fact that the
officer smelled marijuana, and defendant has offered no evidence to
12

suggest that this finding is clearly erroneous. Finally, the smell
of marijuana, a controlled substance, is clearly incriminating.
The officer did not search the vehicle until after he detected the
odor of burnt marijuana twice —

once as he talked with the driver

prior to issuing the citation and again as he handed the completed
citation to the driver for his signature. Because the requirements
of plain smell were fulfilled, the search was lawful.

The trial

court's denial of defendants' suppression motion was, therefore,
correct and should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The odor of burnt marijuana emanating from defendants' car in
the course of a lawful traffic stop provided probable cause for the
officer to search the vehicle under the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement.
motion

to

suppress

The trial court's denial of defendants'
evidence

seized

in

that

search

should,

therefore, be upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

\H^

day of October, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
yWfaMML

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Randall Gaither, attorney for appellant, 321 South 600 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84102, this _/f/^day of October, 1992.
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Paul F. Graf #1229
Washington County Attorney
O. Brenton Rowe #2815
Deputy Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]
])

PLAINTIFF,
VS.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

SALVATORE ANTHONY CALCATERRA, ]|

CRIMINAL NO. 911500026

KIRK DUDLEY,

CRIMINAL NO. 911500027

]>

DEFENDANT.

]

The above-entitled matters having been consolidated for
hearing on the Defendants for Motion to Suppress before the aboveentitled Court on the 24th day of April, 1991, and the State of
Utah being represented by O. Brenton Rowe, Deputy Washington County
Attorney, and Randall T\ Gaither, attorney for the Defendants being
present, and the Defendants, Salvatore Anthony Calcaterra and Kirk
Dudley, being present, and the Court having received testimony and
exhibits in evidence, the Court having reviewed the files and
records herein and being fully advised in the premises, now makes
and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on December 9, 1990, the Defendant, Salvatore
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Calcaterra was driving his vehicle, and Defendant Kirk Dudley was a
passenger, northbound on 1-15 about five miles from the Utah
border,
2.

Utah Highway Patrol Trooper James Lloyd stopped the

vehicle at about mile post six, after determining the Calcaterra
vehicle was traveling about 78 miles an hour in a zone where that
was excessive speed.
3. That Trooper Lloyd issued a citation to Mr. calcaterra for
the speeding violation.
4.

That during the process of the filling out of the citation

in his vehicle, Trooper Lloyd requested information from EPIC — El
Paso Information Center —

for the reason that he had smelled

marijuana in the vehicle as he was speaking to the driver at the
side of the vehicle prior to the issuance of the citation.
5.

That the officer did detect the odors of marijuana.

6.

The officer went back to the vehicle, issued the citation

to Mr. Calcaterra, handed him the citation and his driver's
license.
7.

That it was a normal traffic violation, with the addition

of an odor of marijuana.
8.

That the officer asked Mr. Calcaterra whether or not he

had drugs, weapons or alcohol in the vehicle.
9.
10.

Mr. Calcaterra replied that he did not.
The officer asked if he could search the trunk of the

vehicle.
11.

Mr. Calcaterra replied that he was not carrying anything.
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12.

The officer asked again if he could search the trunk of

the vehicle.
13.

Mr. Calcaterra then alighted and went around and opened

he trunk of the vehicle and allowed the officer to search.
14.

While he was engaged in the search of the trunk, the

officer received a response from the dispatcher in Cedar City to
his inquiry of EPIC, indicating that Mr. Calcaterra had a previous
history of involvement in drugs offenses.
15.

The officer returned to the vehicle and continued the

search of the trunk and found nothing of note in the trunk.
16.

The officer asked Mr. Calcaterra about the information

that hefd received from the dispatcher relating to an alleged
conviction involving the transportation of drugs.
17.

Mr. Calcaterra explained to the officer as he understood

it, that he had been arrested, but the charges had been dismissed.
18.

The officer then asked if he could search the interior of

the vehicle.
19.

Mr. Calcaterra indicated that he was not carrying any of

the things that the officer was looking for.
20.

The officer then inquired a second time whether he could

search the interior of the vehicle by saying "May I search the
interior of the vehicle, then?"
21.

Mr. Calcaterra shrugged his shoulders, with a motion

which the officer indicated on the witness stand.
22.

The officer took that to be consent and proceeded to

search the vehicle.
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23.

Mr. Calcaterra did not object to the search of the

vehicle at that time, nor did the passenger of the vehicle.
24.

The officer, in searching the vehicle, determined that

there was a small quantity of marijuana and what appeared to be a
marijuana pipe hidden in a plastic receptacle on the console
portion of the vehicle.
25.

When Mr. Calcaterra determined that the drug had been

found, he approached the officer and asked for a break.
26.

The officer then handcuffed Mr. Calcaterra and placed him

under arrest.
27.

Mr. Dudley was likewise arrested and handcuffed when the

second officer arrived.
28.

The officers then proceeded to complete the search of the

vehicle and discovered other items of contraband while the
defendants were standing by handcuffed and under arrest.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the decision of the officer to investigate the smell

of marijuana was a level two detention, and the officer did have an
articulable suspicion, based upon the smell of burned marijuana
emanating from the vehicle.
2.

That the Court finds that there was consent to search the

vehicle, and the officer was reasonable, under all the
circumstances, in believing he had consent to search the trunk of
the vehicle.
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3.

That the Court finds that the consent to search the trunk

was voluntarily given.
4.

That the Court also finds that under the totality of the

circumstances, the later shrugging of the shoulders was intended as
consent to search the interior of Mr.Calcaterras vehicle, and the
officer was justified in arriving at that conclusion.
5.

That the Court finds that the actions of the officer were

reasonable, and the search was reasonable.
6.

That there is no reason to suppress the evidence, and the

motion to suppress should be denied.
DATED this

day of mff,

1991.
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J. EHILIP EVES
DISTRICT COURT
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